


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Intelligence Memorandum

Possible Cease-fire Positions

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12 July 1972
No. 2050/72

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
12 July 1972

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

POSSIBLE CEASE-FIRE POSITIONS*

1. Five maps of Indochina are being provided to all recipients of this memorandum under separate cover. The maps are identified by number only, as follows:

MAP NO. 1: Present Areas of Direct Enemy Military Influence.

On a base map showing population densities throughout Indochina, red circles indicate where enemy main force (i.e., NVA) regiments are concentrated

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but they do show in general terms the areas of Indochina where North Vietnamese military influence is the strongest.

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- MAP NO. 2: Suggested U.S. and GVN Initial Negotiating Position, superimposed on a base map showing the existing political divisions of Indochina.
- MAP NO. 3: This map contains the same initial negotiating position as does Map No. 2, but on a base map giving population densities in Indochina.
- MAP NO. 4: Suggested U.S. and GVN Fall-Back Negotiating Position, shown on a map depicting the existing political divisions of Indochina.
- MAP NO. 5: This map repeats the identical fall-back position which appears on Map No. 4, but on a base map giving population densities.

Comments on the Maps

2. The series of maps as a whole represents an attempt to define a negotiating position for a cease-fire. The maps relate only to matters germane to a cease-fire; i.e., areas in which NVA main forces might be regrouped. They do not--repeat not--attempt to portray the geographic outlines of a possible political settlement. The cease-fire terms suggested on the maps and in the paragraphs below are presented to the members of the WSAG for their consideration and discussion. As revisions and changes are formulated, they can be incorporated into new editions of the maps.

3. Two key points bearing on a cease-fire emerge from the current disposition of NVA main forces as shown on Map No. 1. First, the map makes it clear that the wide deployment and dispersal throughout Indochina of NVA units would be one of the most difficult problems affecting any cease-fire negotiations. For practical purposes, a viable solution would require the regroupment of these forces

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


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
either into one contiguous area or a small number of areas. Second, this map shows that for the most part NVA units at present are denied access to the heavily populated areas of Indochina. In a cease-fire, it would not be in our interest to allow the enemy's forces to regroup into areas of higher population density.

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4. Maps No. 2 and No. 3 (the suggested initial negotiating position):



5. The enemy's regroupment areas shown in our initial negotiating position were deliberately designed to have arbitrary boundaries rather than to follow any existing political boundaries. The areas are sufficiently large to absorb the NVA forces presently in Indochina south of the DMZ. Presumably we would not, however, even in our initial negotiating position, demand that Viet Cong local forces move to these areas, although these local forces are now heavily interspersed with NVA "fillers." In the absence of NVA/VC main forces, these local forces at their present strength would pose only a limited threat to the GVN. (One problem which needs further consideration is the question of how the Allies would respond if the North Vietnamese began to transfer large numbers of their regular forces into local Viet Cong units.)



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
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6. Maps No. 4 and No. 5 (the fall-back negotiating position): These maps present a fall-back position in two phases.

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groupment areas, however, have at least the potential for becoming semi-permanent in spite of all rhetoric to the contrary. Since the GVN would undoubtedly consider the loss--under whatever guise--of this territory as a defeat, this portion of the fall-back position was depicted as a separate phase. At the same time, these areas are ones which the GVN could give up without serious loss in terms of population, economics, or strategic position. The psychological

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blow to the GVN would be substantial, but these areas could provide the Communists with what they might regard as a necessary face-saver. It is at least conceivable that such a concession by the GVN might provide a real basis for a cease-fire.

* * * * *

8. A Final Comment: The maps accompanying this memorandum do not accurately reflect the existing areas of Communist control in Indochina for several reasons. In most of Indochina (outside North Vietnam itself), the Communists largely possess empty real estate while the friendly governments control most of the people. In those few areas--specifically Binh Dinh and Kien Hoa provinces of South Vietnam--where the Communists combine area control with a considerable degree of population control, there appears to be no way to realign the political boundaries without making an intolerable--and, more importantly, unworkable--patchwork quilt of the countryside. For this reason we did not depict, on Maps No. 4 and No. 5, a regroupment area in northern Binh Dinh Province (e.g., Phu My District), though this is something the Communists would be almost certain to demand, at least initially, in any cease-fire negotiations. We also did not allow the Communists a regroupment area in the U Minh forest of GVN MR 4, which the Viet Cong and NVA have occupied more or less effectively for years. We rejected depicting a regroupment area in the sparsely populated U Minh on Maps No. 4 and No. 5, because it would be very difficult to prevent this territory (which has access to the sea) from becoming a permanent Viet Cong base deep within South Vietnam.

9. Elsewhere in South Vietnam where the Communists now exercise a degree of control, their control is what is known as "time-perishable." It is exercised in areas where the enemy is presently located because of the current offensive deployment of NVA main forces and the consequent realignment of GVN forces to defend populated areas. The North Vietnamese probably will not be able to retain a permanent hold on most of these areas after their current offensive ends.

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